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IV 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
H. DELlVIAR \VHITE and NORMA 
L. WHITE, his wife, 
Plaintiff's and Appellants, 
vs. 
WEBER llASIN WATER CON-
SERVANCY DISTRICT, 
Defendant and llcspundcnt. 
Case No. 
11474 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages to the plaintiffs' land 
allegedly caused by the construction and operation of 
the Willard Gravity Canal, one of the projects of the 
Weber Basin Reclamation Project. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court granted the defendant's Motion for a 
Directed Verdict dismissing the action upon the ground, 
1 
among others, that the defendant was not the proper 
party defendant and made findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and entered judgment dismissing the action. 
STA'l'E.MENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in the Appellants' Brief 
is inaccurate and incomplete. Much undisputed evidence 
is entirely ignored and highly speculative conclusions 
are stated in the brief as facts. The parties will Le 
referred to as the "plaintiffs" and the "defendant or 
District," and the Willard Gravity Canal will be re-
ferred to as the "Willard Canal." 
The evidence is undisputed that the Willard Canal, 
which the plaintiffs claim damaged their land, is one 
of the project works of the Weber Basin Project, a 
federal reclamation project, and was located, con-
structed, designed and operated by the United States. 
(Tr. 135, 148, 149, 249) The United States took title 
to all of the project works inclding the canal pursuant 
to the Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902 ( 32 Stat. 
388) 43 USCA 372 et seq. as amended. Paragraph 
23 of the repayment contract, Exhibit D, between the 
United States and the Weber Basin Water Conserv-
ancy District, dated December 23, 1952, provides that 
title to the project works shall remain in the United 
States until oth~rwise provided by Congress. 
The government engineers in charge of the con-
struction of the project testified that the United States 
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did all of the engineering work, supervised the con-
struction and operated the Willard Canal. (Tr. 135, 148, 
H9, 249) The engineer for the defendant testified that 
he had nothing whatever to do with the location, de-
sign, construction or operation of the canal, nor did 
the defendant. (Tr. H8, 247) We quote from the testi-
money of Mr. Rex Greenhalgh, a Bureau of Reclama-
tion engineer : 
" ... Q. ls the document you hold in your hand 
with the sheet marked Defendent' s Exhibit 6 an 
official document prepared by the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation in connection with the 
construction of the Willard Canal? 
A. It is. 
Q. Do you know, personally, whether the 
Weber Conservancy District or any engineer or 
officer connected with that District had any-
thing to do with preparing any part of that doc-
ument or assembling any of the data obtained 
therein? 
A. Yes, I do know. They did not have any-
thing to do with this. 
Q. Where were the designs for the canal pre-
pared? 
A. The preliminary layout and location for 
the canal and designs were prepared in the Og-
den office under my supervision. It is this data 
which we call design data that is submitted to the 
Denver office where the final designs are pre-
pared and issued. Designs and specifications are 
prepared in Denver. 
Q. That is the Denver office of the Bureau of 
Reclamation? 
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A. The Denver office of the Bureau of Recla-
mation .... " (Tr. 148, 149) 
The federal officer in charge of right of way acqui-
sition testified that the United States acting through 
its own employees caused the land descriptions to be 
prepared for the 'Villard Canal right of way and the 
contracts and deeds to be prepared and signed. (Tr. 
127, 241) . On the Willard Canal, there was only one 
tract which the defendant was requested to acquire and 
that was the Miller tract which is not involved here. 
(Tr. 241) The purchase of a small part of the Riley 
Taylor tract was negotiated by a federal employee, 
Charles S. Sloan, before the remaining part was deeded 
to the plaintiffs. Such remaining part is the land which 
the plaintiffs claim was damaged by the canal. (Tr. 
125) Mr. Sloan was the only negotiator on the Willard 
Canal. (Tr. 124, 125) The defendant had nothing to 
do with the negotiations for right of way (except for 
the ::Miller tract) (Tr. 124, 125) The Taylor deed, 
Exhibit C, names the United States as Grantee. 
The defendant put in evidence a great deal of 
engineering and other data relating to the water table 
on the plaintiffs' land, the soil conditions, topography 
and vegative cover on the land before the construction 
of the canal. Exhibits l, 2, 3 and 4 are air photos of the 
plaintiffs' land taken in 1946, 1952, 1958, and 1965, 
respectively. The plaintiffs' land is circled on each map 
in red. It will be noted from the photographs that al-
though the surrounding land was obviously cultivated 
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and producing agricultural crops, the involved land 
was, until after its purchase by the plaintiffs, in its native 
condition and was described by Mr. Greenhalgh as 
follows: 
" ... Q . ..1.-lnd. when you went out in 1958, I will 
ask you what the property was being used for, if 
anything? 
A. It was idle at the time except for pasture. 
There might have been a few livestock in it, in 
pasture. 
Q. Will you describe the ground and the pres-
ence or absence of vegetation in the area on that 
land and the type of vegetation, if you recall? 
A. The land has a topography that is undulat-
ing, undulating means little hills and hummocks, 
low depressions, various spots through it. In the 
northwest corner of the property is a higher area 
on which there was sagebrush. Among this sage-
brush was also growin,g junegrass and early 
grasses which die out in the summertime. Towards 
the center portion and the south portion of the 
area, there were salt grasses growing and then 
there was an area towards the south end which 
is an area which was irregular in shape, which 
also had some sagebrush growing on it. There 
were various spots throughout the area, small de-
pressions, where there was no vegetation what-
soever growing in these various areas .... " (Tr. 
142, 143) 
Mr. Greenhalgh testified that many auger holes 
were drilled on the land now owned by the plaintiffs 
to test the soil and to determine the depth to water in 
1950. The water table was high in much of the land. 
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(Tr. 135-138) There was a pond on part of it. (Tr. 
37). 
The plaintiffs purchased the land in question 011 
May 31, 1962. (Tr. 17) It was described by the plain-
tiff Delmar White as follows: 
1
'. • • Q. Well, do you remember when you 
bought it in 1962 whether there was about fifty 
percent in sagebrush? 
A. It would be about fifty percent, scattered. 
Q. \Vas it all in one part of it? 
A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. Where was it? 
A. It was scattered here and there on the knolls 
and all over the property. 
Q. Was the property a series of knolls with 
brush and then the land in between the knolls 
alkali and with alkali type grass growing there? 
A. It was native grasses. I couldn't tell you 
that, Sir. 
Q. There was a pond on it? 
A. There was a pond that stayed during the 
spring that water would drain to it and then 
evaporate during the summer. 
Q. Do you know whether the pond was a salt 
water pond? 
A. I couldn't tell you." (Tr. 41, 42) 
Work on the canal was started by the digging of a 
drain. (Tr. 174) The drain was about eight or nine 
6 
feet deep and twenty-five to thirty feet wide and was 
constructed past what is now the White property on 
the 18th and 19th of March, 1962. (Tr. 173) The drain 
was located along the east side of the canal site to de-
water the area. (Tr. 175) The Willard Canal was under 
construction from 1962 to 1964 and the deep drain was 
in operation during that period. (Tr. 175) The effect 
of the deep drain was to de-water not only the place 
where the canal was constructed but also the surround-
ing area including the plaintiffs' land. See the chart, 
Exhibit 9, and the testimony of Mr. Wallace. (Tr. 
212-217-B) . After the completion of the canal, the 
ground water was restored to its high pre-canal eleva-
tion. (Tr. 217-A, 217-B) The barley crop shown on 
the plaintiffs' photos, Exhibits A-1 and A-2, was planted 
in the Fall of 1963 after the deep drain was constructed 
and in operation and was harvested in 1964. Another 
good crop was planted in 1962 and harvested in 1963. 
(Tr. 24) . When the drain became inoperative after 
the completion of the canal in 1964 the water table 
rose as depicted in Exhibit 9, substantially to its pre· 
canal elevation and destroyed the crop. 'Ve quotl! from 
the testimony of Mr. Greenhalgh: 
" ... Q. The Exhibit. I think Mr. Skeen will 
probably bring it out when he questions you. 
Now, I show you Exhibit A-1 and A-2, which 
are two colored· photographs and assuming that 
those represented pictures of the crops on the 
\Vhite property in the Fall of 196-.l<, would it still 
be your opinion that these lands are not suitable 
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for agriculture? I think those are the words you 
used. 
A. \,Ye were referring to the land classification. 
Q. When you were discussing that, I think you 
made the statement. 
A. At the time the land classification was 
taken, it was not suitable for agriculture under 
the conditions that it was then in. 
Q. All right. What about 1964 when these pic-
tures were taken? 
A. In 1964 when these pictures were taken, 
two years after we had our initial construction 
of the Willard Canal which was a deep portion 
taken out of the center portion of the Canal for 
the purpose of lowering the watertable, during 
these two years the watertable was lowered as 
much as four feet throughout the area. The water-
table being lowered made it such that the crops 
could be grown .... " (Tr. 158, 159) 
The carefully prepared engineering and scientific 
data in evidence and the air photos are undisputed in 
the record. The expert testimony of engineers express-
ing opinions of the position and movement of ground 
water before and after construction of the Willard 
canal and their conclusion that the operation of the 
canal could not raise the ground water level above its 
elevation under pre-canal conditions will be referred 
to in the argument. 
At the close of the testimony the defendant made 
a motion for a directed verdict dismissing the action 
upan the grounds, first, that the evidence ''does not 
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disclose any cause of action whatever, under any theory 
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District." Secondly, that '·there 
is no evidence of damage of any character to the plain-
tiffs' land either by raising the water table in the land 
or by leakage of water from the canal . . . " (Tr. 260-
261) The court reserved its ruling on the motion ( R. 
261) and submitted three special interrogatories to the 
jury as follows : 
" ... Do you find it proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District is a real party in interest 
in this proceeding? . . ." 
" ... Do you find it proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the construction of the canal 
in the manner in which it was constructed has in 
fact caused the water level on the plaintiffs' land 
to be raised to a point where substantial damages 
have accrued to them? ... " 
" ... Do you find it proven by a clear prepond-
erance of the evidence that at the time the deed 
was granted by the Taylors for the release of 
their lands for the construction of the canal in 
question that the damages which you have found 
in interrogatory number two were of such a gross 
nature or of a different nature than any contem-
plated or forseeable so that it can be fairly said 
that the bargain reached between the Taylors and 
those they dealt with did not include a contempla-
tion of a risk of this type being accepted in owner-
ship of the land as it continues? ... " (Tr. 298) 
Timely exceptions were taken to the interroga-
tories, in writing, as follows: 
9 
" ... 1. Excepts to the first interragatory con-
tained in instruction No. 3 for the reason that 
such interrogatory would submit to the jury a 
question of law which should be determined by 
the court. The evidence is uncontradicted that the 
Willard Canal was located, planned, designed, 
constructed and operated by the United States, 
that it is located on land acquired by the United 
States and that the United States did not request 
or direct the District to acquire the right of way 
for the 'Villard Canal from the Taylors, pre-
decessors of the plaintiff's. There is not a single 
controverted issue of fact which would have any 
bearing on the legal determination of whether the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District is the 
proper defendant. 
2. Excepts to the second interrogatory for the 
reasons (a) that it is beyond the issues framed 
by the pleadings because it covers water other 
than ''canal waters," which allegedly entered 
upon the plaintiffs' land (see paragraphs 8 and 
9 of the amended complaint) and (b) the word-
ing is so general that the jury may answer "yes" 
because the water level on the plaintiffs' land, 
which was lowered by the deep drain to de-water 
the area during the construction of the 'Villard 
Canal, returned to its former level, when after 
the completion of the canal the operation of the 
deep drain was discontinued (see Exhibit 9) . 
The plaintiffs are not entitled to have their land 
drained by the continued operation of the deep 
drain, and there was no invasion of their rights 
unless it was shown that the water level was high-
er after construction of the canal than it was be-
fore construction. 
3. Excepts to the third interrogatory for the 
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reasons (a) as a matter of law any claim for ad-
ditional compensation arising out of the contract 
of sale by the Taylors of land to the United 
States for the construction of the Willard Canal 
belongs to the Taylors and there is no evidence 
that such claim was assigned by the Taylors to 
the plaintiffs. The Taylor deed to the United 
States is dated August 22, 1961 and the deed 
from the Taylors to the plaintiffs is dated M~y 
31, 1962. The mere deeding of the land from the 
Taylors to the plaintiffs did not transfer to the 
plaintiffs a claim for additional compensation; 
(Mesich v. Board of County Commissioners, 40 
N.M. 412, 129 P.2d 974) (b) that the contract 
of sale which resulted in the delivery of the deed 
by the Taylors to the United States was a con-
tract between the United States and the Taylors 
and it cannot be set aside and the compensation 
cannot be increased without having both parties 
to the contract before the court and proof of mis-
take of fact, fraud, imposition or other reason for 
equitable relief. The necessary parties are not 
before the court and no evidence to support the 
setting aside of the contract has been adduced; 
( c) that the use of the words "and those they 
dealt with" is confusing and should be replaced 
with "the United States" for there is no evidence 
that the 'Taylors dealt with anyone other than 
an employee of the United States; (d) there is 
no evidence in the record as to the surrounding 
circumstances or as to any other fact bearing on 
the question as to what risks were in the contem-
plation of the parties when the right of way was 
acquired by the United States .... " (R. 15, Tr. 
264) 
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The verdict of the jury was "yes" to each interroga-
tory. (Tr. 297-199) The court did not enter judgment 
on the special verdict. 
After further argument of the <lefendant's motion 
for a directed verdict on December 2, 1968, the trial 
court granted the motions. (Tr. 300) Findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a judgment were made and given. 
(R. 23A, 23B). 
The court found: 
" ... 4. That said Willard Gravity Canal was 
located, planned, designed and constructed ex-
clusively by the United States of America, act-
ing through the Secretary of the Interior and 
since its construction has been operated exclu-
sively by the United States. That the defendant 
has not participated in any engineering work, 
construction work upon, or operation and main-
tenance of said canal. That the land on which the 
said canal is located, is, and at all times since con-
struction of the canal began has been, owned by 
the United States. That the defendant has not 
participated in any respect in the acquisition of 
land for construction of said Willard Canal e:+-
cept for the acquisition of one tract which was 
obtained by the defendant and transferred to the 
United States (which said tract is known as the 
.Miller Tract and is not involved in this suit), 
but all such land was acquired by the U nite<l 
States .... " (R. 23a) 
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'' ... 6. That in l\Iarch, 1962, the United States, 
acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, De-
partment of the Interior constructed a deep drain 
immediately East of plaintiffs' land for the pur-
pose of de-watering the area to facilitate the con-
struction of the Willard Gravity Canal. That 
said drain temporarily lowered the water table 
in the surrounding lands including the plaintiffs' 
lands during said construction, and when the 
canal was completed in 1964 the use of the deep 
drain was abandoned and the water table in the 
surrounding lands raised to substantially the 
same level as it was prior to construction. That 
the construction, operation and maintenance of 
the canal has not caused the plaintiffs' land to 
become wet, soggy and interspersed with sur-
f ace ponds and has not otherwise or in any respect 
damaged plaintiffs' land. That no water has 
leaked from the canal since its construction and 
plaintiffs' land has not been flooded, seeped, sub-
merged or otherwise affected by water from the 
said Willard Gravity Canal. That no crops grow-
ing on the plaintiffs' land have been damaged or 
destroyed by water from the Willard Gravity 
Canal, or other source, as a result of any action, 
inaction or condition created by or chargeable to 
the defendant, nor has plaintiffs' land been dam-
aged by reason of any action, inaction or condi-
tion created by or chargeable to the defendant . 
. . . " (R. 23a) 
The appeal is from the judgment based on findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 20) 
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STATEMENT 01<-. POINTS 
I. The trial court properly dismissed thi~ action on 
motion because the District is not the proper party 
defendant. 
2. The findings of fact are supported by undis-
puted evidence. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, that there was a cause 
of action against the defendant, it belonged to the 
Taylors, who were estopped to assert it, and was not 
assigned to the plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIS-
MISSED THIS ACTION ON MOTION BE-
CAUSE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT THE 
PROPER PARTY DEFENDANT. 
When the parties rested the defendant moved for 
dismissal on the ground that there was no evidence in 
the record which would support a cause of action by 
the plaintiffs and against the defendant on any theory. 
The ruling on the motion was reserved by the court 
for further argument and after argument, some two 
14 
weeks after the trial, it was granted because the de-
fendant was not the proper party to be sued. 
The question in this case which logically should 
be considered first is whether the defendant is liable 
for damage to the plaintiffs' land caused by the con-
struction of the Willard Canal by the United States 
under the applicable federal law, the repayment and 
amendatory repayment contracts and the undisputed 
facts discussed above. We assume for the sake of argu-
ment only, but do not admit, that there was damage 
suffered. 
The facts detailed above that the Willard Canal 
is one of the project works of the Weber Basin Project; 
that it was constructed under the Reclamation Act; 
pursuant to the repayment contract, Exhibit D, which 
is in evidence; that it was located, designed, constructed 
and operated exclusively by the United States; that 
the right of way for the canal, (except the Miller tract) 
was acquired by the United States; that the United 
States is the owner of the Willard Canal and took title 
to a part of the Riley Taylor tract; that the remainder 
of such tract was later sold to the plaintiffs and that 
the defendant had no part in designing, constructing 
or operating the canal or acquiring the right of wa~· 
therefor are all undisputed in the record 
The plaintiffs take the position, as we understand 
it, that the defendant is the proper party defendant 
as they construe the repayment contract. They point 
out that many cases have been filed by the defendant 
15 
to condemn land for the Weber Basin Project; that in 
some instances title ha.s been taken in the name of the 
United States and in some cases title has been acquired 
by the defendant; that the transaction between the 
United States and the defendant was a loan; that the 
United States retained "naked title to the project 
works" as security for the repayment of the sum ad-
vanced, and that " ... after payment has been made 
the title to the project works which has been retained 
by the United States is subject to being transferre<l 
to the defendant pursuant to an act of Congress." See 
appellants' brief pp. 25-35. In effect, the appellants 
argue that either the defendant is the principal and the 
United States is the agent; that the defendant is the 
purchaser of the project works under a contract of 
purchase or that the United States is the money lender 
and the defendant is the borrower. 
In making sueh an argument the plaintiffs ignore 
the basic Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, (32 Stat. 
388), 43 USCA 372 et seq., the Act of August 29, 
1949 ( 63 Stat. 677) which authorized the Weber Basin 
Project, the repayment contract, Exhibit D, and the 
undisputed facts regarding the design, construction 
and the operation of the Willard Canal, and the actual 
acquisition of right of way for the Canal. 
Sections 2, 4, and 6 of the Reclamation Act, supra, 
insofar as pertinent provide: 
"Sec. 2 .... That the Secretary of the Interior 
is hereby authorized and directed to make exam-
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inatious and surveys for, and to locate and con-
struct, as herein provided, irrigation works for 
the storage, diversion and development of waters . 
. . . " 43 USCA 411 
"Sec. 4 .... That upon the <letermination by 
the Secretary of the Interior that any irrigation 
project is practicable, he may cause to be let con-
tracts for the construction of the same. . . ." 43 
USCA 419 
"Sec. 6 .... That the title to an<l the manage-
ment and operation of the reservoirs and the 
works necessary for their protection and opera-
tion shall remain in the Government until other-
wise provided by Congress." 43 USCA 491 and 
498 
"Sec. 7 .... That where in carrying out the pro-
visions of this Act it becomes necessary to acquire 
any right or property, the Secretary of the In-
terior is hereby authorized to acquire the same for 
the United States by purchase or condemnation . 
. . . " 43 USCA 421 
Section l of the Act of August 2g, 1949, ( 63 Stat. 
677) provides in part: 
'' ... That the Secretary of the Interior, through 
the Bureau of Reclamation, is hereby authorized 
to construct, operate and maintain the Weber 
Basin Project .... " 
The repayment contract, Exhibit D, provides in 
Article 2: 
"'Vhereas, the United States has investigated, 
planned and proposes to construct the Weber 
Basin Project, herein styled the Project, for the 
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diversion, storage and distribution of water of the 
Weber River, and its tributaries, and water from 
other sources, for irrigation, municipal and in-
dustrial use, generation of electric power, flood 
control, recreation, fish and wildlife purposes, 
and for the drainage of project land." 
In Article 4 of the contract it is stated: 
''a. The project works to be constructed by the 
United States, include, without being limited by 
enumeration, the following: 
* * * 
Conveyance System 
* * * 
Willard Gravity Canal will extend in a northerly 
direction 10.8 miles from the Slaterville diversion 
dam to the Willard Reservoir. It will convey 
Weber River water to the reservoir and will sup-
ply irrigation water to the existing Plain City 
and Warren Canals. The canal will be earth 
lined and will have a maximum capicity of ll05 
second-feet." 
Article 6a provides : 
"The District shall, at its own expense, nego-
tiate for the acquisition of all lands and ease-
ments needed by the United States for the con-
struction, ope.ration and maintenance of the proj-
ect works, usmg for that purpose such forms of 
contracts, deeds and other necessary papers as 
are satisfactory to the Secretary. Upon procur-
ing the execution of the necessary contracts, 
deeds and other papers, the District shall transmit 
them to the Re~ional Director of Region 4 of the 
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Bureau of Reclamation, or such other officer as 
may be designated by the Secretary. Payment of 
the purchase price of lands and easements pur-
chased will be made by the United States in due 
course, if, in the opinion of the Secretary the 
purchase price is reasonable and the instruments 
of conveyance are in satisfactory form and show 
satisfactory title in the United States." 
Article 7 a provides: 
"Subject to the terms and conditions of this 
contract, the United States will expend on the 
construction of the project works the sum of 
seventy million, three hundred eighty-five thou-
sand dollars ($70,385,000.00) or so much thereof', 
as, in the opinion of the Secretary is necessary 
for such purpose within the limit of funds made 
available by the Congress, herein referred to as 
the project cost. The District agrees to pay to the 
United States the amount herein referred to as 
the construction obligation. The District's con-
struction obligation shall be the portion of the 
project cost finally allocated by the Secretary 
to irrigation and municipal and other water sup-
ply purposes as provided for in the Act of August 
29, 1949 ( ()3 Stat. H77), but not to exceed $57,-
694,000. The portion of the project cost allocated 
to flood control, recreation, and fish and wlidlifc 
shall be nonreimbursable. " 
Article 10 provides: 
"a. The District shall have the permanent and 
exclusive use of all project water subject only to 
(I) the right of the United States to exercise 
control tl1ereovcr for flood control, recreational 
and fish and wildlife purposes, consistent with 
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the authorized project plan, and (2) the require-
ment that project water i~ excess of that neces-
sary to satisfy project needs in any ~ear shall be 
retained in reservoirs for future proJect use pro-
vided that such excess water may be withdrawn 
from said reservoir in accordance with (I) above 
but may not be disposed of for other than proj-
ect purposes without prior approval of the Sec-
retary. 
b. The District shall make water allotments 
and contracts for the disposal of project water 
for irrigation, municipal and miscellaneous uses 
in accordance with the applicable unit notice and 
the Utah Water Conservancy District Act. Such 
water allotments and contracts shall be upon 
terms satisfactory to the Secretary, shall be ap-
proved by him in advance, and shall not be 
amended without his written consent." 
Article 23 provides: 
''Title to the project works constructed or 
acquired by the United States shall remain in the 
United States until otherwise provided by the 
Congress, notwithstanding transfer of the opera-
tion and maintenance of any such works to the 
District." 
.Ai·ticle 30 provides : 
"The Secretary reserves the rights, so far as 
the purport thereof may be consistent with the 
provisions of this contract, to make reasonable 
rules and regulations and to add to or modify 
them as may be deemed proper and necessary to 
carry out the trne intent and meaninIT of the law 
and of this contract." 
0 
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It is significant that the project was constructed 
not only to make project water available to the defend-
ant, but for purposes of flood control, recreation and 
fish and wildlife. The money allocated to these purposes 
is by Article 7a nonreimbursable and consistent there-
with Article IO provides that the District's use of project 
water is expressly subject to '' (I) the right of the 
United States to exercise control thereof for flood con-
trol, recreation and fish and wildlife purposes consistent 
with vhe authorized plan . . . " The public purpose of 
the project is evident. 
There is nothing in the contract which divests the 
United States, acting through the Secretary, of its 
authority to acquire rights of way for the Willard 
Canal granted by section 7 of the Reclamation Act, 
43 USCA 42I. In fact in Article 6a. the District is 
obligated to acquire all lands and easements "needed by 
the United States." The record is clear that the Dis-
trict was not requested to acquire Willard Canal right 
of way needed by the United States, except for the 
Miller tract not involved here. (Tr. 24I) 
Defendant's Exhibit I I is an amendatory repay-
ment contract dated June 30, I96I, which among other 
amendments provides for new facilities, an increase 
in constructoin and nonreimbursable costs, and for the 
District to " . . . perform any or all actions necessary 
in connection with the acquisition of lands required by 
the United States ... " when "requested in writing by 
the contracting officer." In Article I8 it is provided 
that: 
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" ... this amendatory contract shall not be 
binding upon the Uwited States nor shall any 
water be delivered pursuant to this amendatory 
contract until the proceedings on the part of the 
District for the authorization of the execution of 
the contract shall have been confirmed by decree 
of a court of competent jurisdiction .... " (em-
phasis added) 
The amendatory contract was executed by both 
parties before the Taylor deed dated August 22, 1961 
was obtained by the United States. (Exhibit C). 
It will be noted that Article 18 does not provide 
that the contract shall nut be binding on the District 
until a confirmatory decree is obtained and Article 18 
does not provide that the contract shall have no force 
or effect whatever ( ar argued by the plaintiffs) until 
confirmed. It simply provides that the United States 
was not bound until the contract was confirmed. We 
emphatically state that the District was not bound to 
obtain right of way until requested by the United States 
so to do under both the original and amendatory con-
tracts. No such request was made of the defendant to 
acquire the Taylor tract. (Tr. 241) 
The federal law and the contract provisions quoted 
and discussed above effectually dispose of the appel-
lants' argument that the 'Veber Basin Project actually 
belongs to the defendant; that the repayment contract 
evidences merely a loan with the United States hidincr 
b 
the "naked title to the project works" as security and 
that the United States is only an agent of the defendant 
District. 
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The courts have uniformly held that the repay-
ment entity (the defendant is such entity in this case) 
acts as fiscal agent for the United States on projects 
constructed pursuant to the Reclamation Act and under 
similar repayment contracts. 
In the case of Twin Jl'alls Canal Co. v. American 
Jl'alls Re8ervoir Dist. No. 2, 59 F.2d 19 (Ninth Cir-
cuit--cert. denied 387 U.S. 638) the court had under 
consideration a repayment contract very similar to tLe 
one involved in this action. The court held: 
". . . Two questions are presented: First, is 
American Falls reservoir district No. 2 a party 
in interest-the proper party defendant? 
"It is obvious from the findings of fact and 
the record that not only is title to the system in 
issue in the United States, but that it has exclu-
sive control and entire supervision of construc-
tion and will have until the project is completed, 
and the management and operation will remain 
in it until otherwise provided by the Congress. 
43 USCA Sections 498, 523, 524. Livanis v. 
Northport Irr. Dist., 121 N eh. 777, 238 N.W. 
757; Id., 120 Neb. 314, 232 N.W. 583. 
"Appellee has ha<l no power over, or voice, con-
trol, or po~er in the management, control, or 
operation of the works or project, and no con-
ceivable theory is pointed out, nor is such known 
to the court, how trespass of the United States 
in such construction, maintenance, or operation 
can be charged against appellee, :Malone v. El 
Paso County \Yater Imp. Dist. No. 1 (Tex. Civ. 
App.) 20 S.\V. (2d) 815. There is no distinction 
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between the principle involved in the 1\!Ialone 
Case and that involved in the instant case. The 
maintenance, operation, control, etc., in each case 
was in the United States, and section 6 of the 
Federal Reclamation Act ( 43 USCA Sections 
491, 498) applies to each. The findings supported 
by the evidence, are conclusive that appellee had 
not succeeded to the management, operation of 
control; and that is the decisive factor. The na-
ture of the claim is not material. No liability 
against appellee is established .... " 
In the case of Jtlalonc v. El Paso County Water 
Improvement District No. 1, (Tex. Civ. App.) 20 
S.W. 2d 815, the court had before it a case involving 
a federal reclamation project and the usual repayment 
contract. The question arose as to whether the repay-
ment entity, a water improvement district, was liable 
f'or damages resulting from a canal break. The court 
said: 
'' ... After a careful examination of the stat-
utes, state and federal, relating thereto and two 
contracts pleaded by plaintiff, we find no pro-
vision giving to defendant a voice, much less con-
trol or joint control or joint acting with the 
United States government in the construction, 
operation, or maintenance of the irrigation works. 
The state statute, federal reclamation law and 
' the two contracts, we think state all the duties 
and fix all the liabilities of defendant as such 
fiscal agent, and beyond which defendant has no 
duties or power to act, or power to assume or in-
cur a liability; defendant is a creature of the 
statute .... " 
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The case of Livanis v. Northport Irr. Dist., 121 
Neb. 777, 238 N.W. 757, also involved a reclamation 
project constructed by the United States under the 
Reclamation Act. The contention was made that the 
repayment contract created such legal relationship that 
the District was operating the irrigation system through 
the instrumentality of the United States. The court 
held: 
"However, the contract must be construed 
with reference to the federal and state statutes, 
which are as much apart thereof as though in-
corporated into the body of it. The powers, duties 
and liabilities of the district and the United States 
are only such as each is authorized by statute to 
assume. The federal statute applicable to this 
case is 43 USCA Sections 523, 524. These stat-
utes authorize the secretary of the interior to dis-
pose of surplus water impounded for the purpose 
of irrigating public lands to, among others, irri-
gation districts. The method of carrying out the 
provisions of this act is provided in that canals 
and ditches may be constructed. It is also pro-
vided that, when the payments required by the 
act are made, then the management and opera-
tion of such irrigation works shall pass to the 
owners of the land, to be maintained at their 
expense under such rules and regulations as may 
be acceptable to the secretary of the interior. It 
is further provided that the title to and the man-
agement and operation of the reservoirs and the 
works necessary for their protection and opera-
tion shall remain in the government until other-
~ise provided by congress. Surely there is nothing 
m the federal statutes which indicates, that, in 
the construction, maintenance and operation of 
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irrigation works, the United States was to be-
come the contractor for, or the agent of, the irri-
gation districts formed to take advantage of its 
facilities for impounding and carrying water to 
the land. In effect, the federal statutes negative 
such a relationship, by the retention of title to the 
works; by absolute control of the construction 
and maintenance; and finally by providing that 
when the works are eventually turned over to the 
district it shall be under such rules and regula-
tions as are acceptable to the secretary of the in-
terior. 
* * * 
"The relationship between the United States 
and the district must be determined from the con-
tract and the statutes, both state and federal. The 
only obligation thus asswned by the district is to 
collect and pay-collect from the landowners 
and pay the United States. The contract requires 
the United States to (I) store water in the Path-
finder reservoir; ( 2) grant to lands in the district 
a perpetual water right; ( 3) to use its carriage 
right in Farmers Irrigation District canal for 
benefit of district; ( 4) to construct the necessary 
irrigation works to irrigate the lands in the dis-
trict; ( 5) to construct drainage works, and ( 6) to 
operate and maintain the system until the dis-
trict complies with certain conditions; while the 
only obligation of the district is to collect and 
repay the money to the United States. This re-
lationship has been denominated that of fiscal 
agent. Malone v. El Paso County Water Im-
provement District (Tex. Civ. App.) 20 S.\V. 
(2d) 815. See, also, Twin Falls Canal Co. v. 
American Falls Reservoir District No. 2 (D.C.) 
49 F. (2d) 632 .... " 
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The cases of Davis v. Lugert,-Altws Irrigation Dit>-
trict, .... Okl. .... , 375 P.2d 975; Klamath Irrigation 
Dist v. Carlson, 176 Ore. 336, 157 P.2<l 514; and Omaha 
Life Ins. Co. v. Gering & Ft. Laramie Irr. Dist, 123 
Neb. 761, 244 N.W. 296, all involved federal reclama-
tion projects and the legal relationship of the United 
States and an irrigation district which served as the 
repayment entity under contracts similar to those here 
involved. In the Davis case the court held that the 
district was not liable for alleged damage caused by 
seepage from a project canal because there had been 
no proof of transfer of the operation and maintenance 
to the district. In the Klmnath case the court held that 
the alleged negligence of the United States while in 
control of the operation and maintenance of an irriga-
tion system could not be imputed to the irrigation 
district. 
The court said: 
" ... To overcome the effect of the f e<leral con-
trol of the maintenance, upkeep and operation of 
the system, the allegation is made by defendant 
that such control is a subterfuge and a fraud; and 
it is also alleged that a major portion of the cost 
of the project had been paid by plaintiff district. 
These allegations of fraud and payment were 
not proved. 
"The right to the control by the United States 
Government of the irrigation project in suit at-
tended its initial installation and continued until 
payments by the owners of the land irrigatc<l 
were made as required by the Act of Congress of 
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June 17, 1902, for the major portion of the re-
clamation or construction charges due the United 
States and allocable against plaintiff district, 
Vol. 32 U.S. Stat. Chap. 1093, p. 388 et seq. 
'"The record before us discloses that it was not 
until the month of lVIarch in the year 1942, that 
payments, made in accordance with the provisions 
of said Act of Congress of June 17, 1902, by the 
irrigable landowners in plaintiff district aggre-
gated the major portion required therefrom. 
''No claim is ma<le or suggested that prior to 
payment for said major portion of the construc-
tion charges, plaintiff requested the Secretary of 
the Interior to transfer to pla_intiff the care, op-
eration or maintenance of all or any part of the 
project works in suit, or that the Secretary of the 
Interior made any such transfer pursuant to the 
proviso in Section 5 of the Act of Congress on 
August 13, 1914. Vol. 38 U.S. Stat. Chap. 247, 
p. 686 et seq, 43 U.S.C.A. Section 492. 
"The alleged negligence of the United States 
Government, while in control of the operation, 
maintenance and conduct of the irrigation sys-
tem in suit, could not be imputed to plaintiff; 
hence no suit or action based on such alleged neg-
ligence could be maintained by defendant aaainst 
plaintiff. Livanis v. Northport Irrigation° Dis-
trict, 120 Neb. 314, 232 N.W. 583, affirmed on 
rehearing, 121 Neb. 777, 238 N.,V. 757; Malone 
v. El Paso County Imp. Dist. No. 1, Tex. Civ. 
App., 20 S.W. 2d 815; Twin Falls Canal Co. v. 
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, D.C. 49 
F.2d 632, affirmed on appeal, 9 Cir., 59 F.2d 
19 .... " 
In the Omaha case, which involved alleged leakage of 
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water from a government canal, the court affirmed a 
directed verdict for the irrigation district because the 
evidence was insufficient to show that such leakage was 
a contributing cause of the wet condition of the land. 
In the case of Spurrier v .. lJJ.itchell Irr. Dist., 119 
Neb. 401, 229 N.W. 273, involving seeped lands and 
a claim for relief under a constitutional provision similar 
to that in the Utah Constitution, the court said: 
". . . The defendants in this case having the 
undoubted right to convey to and turn water 
upon the land under their canals and ditches, and 
not being liable for damages resulting to adja-
cent land therefrom, except upon the allegation 
and proof of neglegence, and no such allegation 
or proof having been made in this case, there is 
not invasion of property. In order to recover 
under this self-executing section of the Consti-
tution Hopper v. Douglas County, 75 N eh. 332, 
106 N.W. 331), property must be taken or dam-
aged for a public use. The method of taking or 
damaging must violate the rights of the owner 
thereof. It is not established in this case that any 
right of plaintiffs has been violated. The cases 
and authorities cited by the plaintiffs supporting 
their claim upon this theory do not support the 
view that the owner of a servient tenement may 
recover from a dominant tenement. In the ab-
sence of negligence in the construction, main-
tenance, operation and use of its irrigation works, 
an irrigation district is not liable to an owner of 
land for seepage under section 21, art. l, of the 
Constitution. Such negligence neither being al-
leged nor proved in this case, there can be no re-
covery .... " 
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Inverse condemnation relied upon by the plaintiff's 
is the remedy for a taking of property for public pur-
poses without compensation. To make a case under 
this theory it is, of course, essential that the defendant 
do an act which constitutes a taking or causes damage 
to a property right or in some manner actually parti-
cipated therein. 
The plaintiffs' argument is that the defendant is 
the proper party defendant because it has, in the past, 
filed numerous cases to acquire right of way for Weber 
Ilasin Project works. The seven actions cited on pages 
26 and 27 of the appellants' brief as disclosed by the 
opinions were filed to obtain land and easements for 
the Willard Reservoir, the enlarged Pineview Reservoir 
and other works pursuant to Article 6 of the repayment 
contract, and was a real party in interest under Rule 
17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, at the request of 
the United States. The United States did not request 
the defendant to acquire right of way for the Willard 
Canal (except for the Miller tract not involved herein) . 
(Tr. 241, 242}. 
The district court case of Weber Basin Water Con-
servancy District v. 11racy-Collins Bank & Trust Co., 
et al (see Exhibit E4), was filed by the defendant to 
acquire an easement for its own pipeline which was not 
a part of the federal project. See the testimony of Mr. 
Kostoff. (Tr. 248) 
The plaintiffs have cited two cases in support of 
their argument that the District is the proper party 
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defendant, State v. Leeson, 323 P.2d 692, 84 Ariz. 44 
(appellants' brief p. 33), and Clement v. State Recrea-
tion Board, 35 Cal. 2d. 628, 220 P.2d 897, (p. 34 of 
appellants' brief). 
Neither case involved a reclamation project and 
in both cases the defendants were held responsible be-
cause they performed acts which directly caused the 
damage under cooperative agreements. In the second 
case cited above the State paid half the construction 
costs, purchased the land for rights of way and flowage 
and participated with the federal agencies in the plan-
ning of the project. Responsibility for the control of 
the project was " ... vested concurrently in state and 
federal governments." 220 P. 2d at p. 907). Both 
cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. 
On page 37 of its brief the plaintiffs argue that the 
defendant is trying vigorously to extricate itself from 
liability because '' ... technical considerations bar a 
direct suit against the United States . . . " No cases 
are cited to support this rash statement. The law is to 
the contrary. See United States v. Kansas City Life 
Ins. Co., 339 U.S.799, 94 L.Ed. 1277, cited on pages 
19 and 20 of the appellants' brief. See also United 
States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17,2 L.Ed. 2d ll09. 
28 USC, Chap. 85, sec. 1346, subd (a) par 2 
28 USC, Chap. 91, sec. 1491 
See Cha plc:r XXlX, Nichols on Eminent Domain. 
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We submit that under the facts of this case, the 
provisions of the Reclamation Act, the repayment con-
tract and amendatory contract and the decisions in the 
case of Twin Falls Canal Co. v. American Falls Reser-
voir District No. 2, and other cases cited above, the de-
fendant was merely the fiscal agent of the United 
States, and is not liable. This point is determinative of 
this case and the judgment of the district court should 
be affirmed. 
2. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUP-
PORTED BY UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE. 
The trial court made findings of fact which are 
briefly summarized as follows: 
I. That the defendant is a water conservancy 
district. 
2. That the plaintiffs are the owners of the land 
which is the subject of this action. 
3. That in accordance with the repayment contract, 
the defendant is entitled to the use of Weber Basin 
project water. The operation of the Willard Canal is 
described. 
4. The finding is quoted in full on page 12 of this 
brief. 
5. The United States acquired land from Riley 
E. Taylor and "f\'ife for the canal location which was 
formerly a part of the parcel now owned by the plain-
tiffs. 
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6. This finding is quoted in full on pages 12, 13 of 
this brief. 
Findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 are not con-
troversial and are supported by admissions in the plead-
ings and documentary evidence. Findings of fact Nos. 
4 and 6 are supported by the evidence discussed below 
even though such evidence is considered in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs. 
Finding of Fact No. 4. 
The testimony of engineers Greenhalgh and Kost-
off is that the United States located, designed, con-
structed and operated the Willard Canal. (Tr. 135, 
148, 149, 249). The applicable provisions of the Recla-
mation Act and the provisions of the repayment con-
tract discussed above, all uncontroverted, support the 
first two sentences of finding No. 4. The right of way 
for the canal was acquired by the United States. (Tr. 
172, 183) and title is in the United States. (Exhibit 
C). The testimony of 0. B. Birch, which is also un-
contradicted, establishes that the defendant had nothing 
to do with the acquisition of land for the Willard Canal 
(except the Miller tract which is not here -involved) . 
(Tr. 241, 242) The defendant had nothing to do with 
the negotiations for the right of way. (Tr. 124, 125) 
This undisputed testimony supports the remaining sen-
tence of paragraph 4 of the findings. 
Finding of Fact No. 6. 
'The first three st..:utences of finding of fact No. 6 
relating to the construction cf the deep drain along the 
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east side of the plaintiffs' land to de-water the area 
and its effect on the land during construction from 
1962 to 1964 is supported by the testimony of engi-
neers, Greenhalgh, Eldredge and \Vallace. (Tr. 147, 
159, 173, 17 4, 17 5, 212-217H). Exhibit 9, which 
graphically shows the lowering of the water table from 
1962 to 1964 and the restoring of the water table to 
its pre-canal level after completion of the canal, is based 
upon actual measurements and is uncontradicted in 
the record. In fact, the testimony of the plaintiff, 
Delmar White, corroborates the findings and conclu-
sions of the engineers as to the lowering and raising of 
the water table. (Tr. 22-25, 49-53, ti2) The testimony 
mentioned above, the air photos, the engineering reports 
and Exhibit 9 are all uncontroverted by any competent 
evidence. The testimony of Clyde Hancock, who was 
not an engineer (Tr. 104) but was a laborer and main-
tenance mechanic (Tr. 115) did not controvert the 
testimony mentioned above as to the effect of the deep 
drain during construction. His conclusions about the 
hardpan condition in the canal site did not inject into 
the case a jury question for two reasons: ( 1) It was 
not sufficiently definite to establish that there was a 
water impervious stratum of sufficient extent to con-
fine ground water, and (2) On cross examination he 
made it clear that he was only guessing by stepping 
to Exhibit 4 and drawing with a blue pencil the area 
on the plaintiffs' land covered by the hardpan although 
he had drilled no holes or conducted any investigation 
to locate the hardpan in that area. (Tr. 110-113) 
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The plaintiffs pleaded in their amended complaint 
that water from the Willard Canal Hooded, seeped, 
submerged and otherwise affected their land (R. 7, 
par. 8). On cross examination, Mr. White admitted 
that the water in his land was not leaking from the 
canal, but blamed the wet condition on the hardpan 
being broken. (Tr. 67) The abandonment of the claim 
of leakage is admitted in the appellants' brief p. 6. In 
fact, on page 18 the plaintiffs abandon all claims that 
the damage was caused by more water or a higher water 
table in their land. 
There is no proof m the record that any action 
or inaction or condition chargeable to the defendant 
caused ::my loss of crops or damage to the plaintiffs' 
land. Mr. White himself testified that the damage was 
caused by increased water pressure. (Tr. 29) There 
is no proof that any act of the defendant cause this. 
The following expert opinions of engineers relating 
to the effect of constructing and operating the canal 
are uncontradicted in the record and further support 
Finding No. 6. 
Mr. Greenhalgh: 
" ... Q. Based on your study of the area and the 
soil and the results of the drill holes that were 
put there by the Bureau of Reclamation, do you 
have an opinion as to whether the construction 
of a canal along the east side of the land would 
cause the ground water to rise to the surface 
where it didn't rise before? 
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A. I see no reason whatsoever, no explanation 
as to why it should rise, due to the construction 
of the canal in the manner in which we construct-
ed it. 
Q. Could water have risen to the surface by 
reason of fracturing any part of the soil in that 
area, that you found in that area? 
A. Any soil that we encountered was pervious 
before we went in there. We couldn't increase 
the perviousness by digging through it .... " (Tr. 
147) 
Mr. Eldredge: 
" ... Q. Did you encounter in digging the canal 
anything that could be considered an impervious 
blanket which would hold ground water down? 
A. No. Your cemented sands are not as im-
pervious as your regular sand, the permeability 
rate is much smaller, but the water could go 
through them. 
Q. And that, you say was sporatic? 
A. Yes, it wasn't consistent over the whole 
canal. 
Q. 'Vas there anything to confine water to a 
lower depth that it would rise to, if you broke 
through it? 
A. No, the majority of our water, we found, 
was above the cemented sand layer. " (Tr. 
174, 175) 
Mr. Wallace: 
" ... Q. I will ask you for au expert's opinion 
as to whether in your opinion the construction of 
36 
the canal across the east side of the 'Vhite prop-
erty has had any effect upon the level of ground 
water in the 'Vhite land 1 
A. It has, only to the effect that when the 
canal is lowered or when it was during construc-
tion the water table was lowered, other than 
that, when the canal is in normal operation; in my 
opinion, it would have no effect on the water 
table. 
Q. Is there any possibility, in your opinion, of 
the existence of the canal structure as located of 
raising the water table under any conditions in 
the White property? 
A. No .... " (Tr. 217-C) 
1
' • •• Q. Now, I will ask you, .Mr. Wallace, if 
you can, as a hydrologist, visualize the situation 
where ground water would be held down in the 
ground by a layer of hardpan. Do you think that 
situation could ~xist? 
A. Yes, it could. 
Q. On the White property? 
A. No, not from the evidence that I have heard 
here, certainly not. In order for it to exist where 
pressure was underneath the hardpan and by 
punching a hole it would be relieving the pres-
sure, you would have to have the hardpan over 
an entire area so that the water accumulating 
under that hardpan came from a higher elevation 
and was held down only by that hardpan and 
could seek and could not get out any other way 
except to puncture that hardpan, but if there is 
anyway for water to escape, water bv law seeks 
its own level, and unless you have a c~mplete im-
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pervious zone covering it, such as whe~e you have 
an artesian well, probably you are drillmg down 
deep where we have deep wells where water may 
push upto the surface, that is a condition where 
an impervious layer is holding the water down 
and by punching a hole through it it relieves 
pressure bringing the water to the surface, but 
you have to have this layer over the entire area 
to keep that pressure. 
Q. Now, if the impervious or nearly impervious 
layer were sporadically located around in a given 
area, could that possibly hold the water down? 
A. No, it couldn't. 
Q. So the fracturing of those intermittent per-
vious or impervious areas would have no effect on 
the level of the ground water? 
A. Absolutely not. Water seeks its own level 
and would have otherwise come up other places 
first. 
Q. Now, would you step to the aerial photo? 
Defendant's Exhibit 3, please. 
Assuming for the sake of this question that 
there was an impervious area of hardpan so noted 
in blue on Exhibit 3, and assuming that that im-
pervious area is continuous over that area marked 
in blue, in your opinion would the fracturing of 
the blue area on the east side cause any change 
in the natural water elevation of ground water on 
the tract surrounded by the red and green lines? 
A. If it were as shown on here the water in 
seeking its own level would work around this 
edge. It would work around this edge or any 
edge and find it5 own level up above this hardpan 
so that by putting a hole through, it is just like 
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putting your hand down in water, the fact that 
you put your hand down in water doesn't mean 
that the water is going to be stopped from coming 
above your hand. It goes around and on top of 
your hand. By the same token, if this hardpan 
were in here the water would go around the edges 
of it, if it indeed were solid and would come up 
on top of the hardpan from the sides. " (Tr. 
217-E, 218) 
The argument of appellant is that the operation 
of the canal and the drain system and flap valves re-
f erred to in the testimony will fluctuate the ground 
water elevation in the VVhite property causing damage. 
We quote from page 18 of the appellants' brief: 
" ... Certainly, there is not the slightest ques-
tion but that the underground water table in the 
area is affected whenever the canal is emptied 
and that, if nothing more, the surging and re-
surging of the ground water table from time to 
time would be in and of itself be adequate to dis-
lodge the previously existing alkaline strata so 
as to cause the alkali minerals to permeate all of 
the White properties even if the maximum heights 
of the water table were only occasionally raised. 
" 
The plaintiffs' description of the damage com-
plained of relates to underground water coming to the 
surface and is very general. The above quoted state-
ment presupposes that the plaintiffs have a right to 
the use of underground water and a right to have the 
water table remain unchanged. There is no record to 
support such claims. The claimed right to have the water 
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table maintained at a constant elevation is not recog-
nized under Utah law. N. M. Long Co. v. Cannon-
Papanikolas Comt. Co., 9 Utah 2d 307, 343 P.2d llOO; 
Weber Basin Wat.er Cons. Dist. v. Gailey, 8 Utah 2d 
55, 328 P.2d 175. 
The only evidence as to the effect of the operation 
of the flap valves is given by the government engineers. 
Nothing is said by any witness about the "surging and 
re-surging" of the ground water table and there is not 
a word in the record that the "alkaline strata" would 
be dislodged and that the alakali minerals would "per-
meate all of the White properties." 
The evidence is that the flap valves would operate 
only when the canal is empty and that would seldom 
occur. It would occur only when the canal was being 
constructed or under repair. (Tr. 196) At the time 
of the trial it had not been empty long enough to check 
the operation of the flap valves. (Tr. 226). Also, the 
testimony is that the reaction of the elevation of the 
ground water to changes in the water content of the 
canal would be very slow. (Tr. 225A, 237). This is 
entirely inconsistent with any "surging and re-surging." 
We submit that there was no evidence to support 
the claim of alleged damages, by leakage of water from 
the canal, breaking of hardpan or surging of the under-
ground water. The trial court did not err by granting 
the motion for a directed verdict of dismissal. 
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3. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, 'l' HAT 
THERE WAS A CAUSE O.F' ACTION 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, IT llE-
LONGED TO THE TAYLORS, WHO WERE 
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT IT, AND WAS NOT 
ASSIGNED TO THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Assuming for the purposes of argument only that 
there was actionable damage to the plaintiffs' land, under 
the theory of inverse condemnation or any other theory, 
a very pertinent question arises as to whether the cause 
of action belongs to the plaintiffs. This question was 
raised in the court below by excepting to the third 
interrogatory as set out at pages 10 and 11 of thi~ brief. 
The record is clear that the United States acquired 
from Riley Taylor and wife a deed to a small tract 
of land to be used for the canal. (Tr. 125) The con-
sideration paid covered the value of the land and for 
cutting off a source of livestock water. (Tr. 128). The 
deed from Taylor to the United States is dated August 
22, 1961 (Exhibit C). 
The Taylors' remaining land was conveyed to the 
plaintiffs by deed dated May 31, 1962. (Tr. 17) There 
is no evidence in the record of any transfer by assign-
ment or by other instrument of a cause of action against 
the defendant or the United States as a result of the 
taking. 
The law is well settled that a claim for additional 
compensation does not follow the land but must be 
transferred by separate instrument. 
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30 C.J.S. 461: 
Putnam v. Oklahoma Cit/j, 203 Old., 570, 224 
P.2d 270; Long v. City of 1~ulsa, 199 Okl., 217, 
184 P.2d 800; Markiewicus v. Methuen, 300 
.Mass., 560, 16 N.E. 2d 32; Alabama G. ~ S.R. 
Co. v. Brown, 215 Ala. 533, 112 So. 131; Duke 
Power Co. v. Rutla:nd, 4 Cir., 60 F.2d 194; Mc-
Elr<Y!J v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 3 Cir. 46 F.2d 777. 
Cert. Den, 283 U.S. 853; 1'aylor Inv. Co. v. Kan-
sas City Power~ Light Co., 182 Kan. 511, 322 
P.2d 817; Garver v. Public Service Com. 77 
N .M. 262, 421 P .2d 788. 
In the M cE lro y case the court said : 
" ... The right of compensation is a personal 
one and does not run with the land. 20 C. J. 1185. 
The owner of the land at the time the right is in-
vaded or the trespass committed is entitled to re-
cover and the subsequent vendee of such an owner 
takes the land subject to the right of his injured 
predecessor to exact and receive the compensa-
tion. Kindred v. Union Pacific Railroad, 225 
U.S. 582, 32 S. Ct. 780, 56 L.Ed. 1216; Central 
R. Co. of New Jersey v. Hetfield, 29 N.J. Law, 
206 .... " 
The Taylors, when they granted the land to the 
United States, estopped themselves from claiming any 
damage, present or future, which might reasonably be 
expected to occur from the necessary, natural and ordi-
nary use of the property for the construction of the 
\Villard Canal by the United States. Williams v. Suter-
Bntte Canal Co., 82 Cal. 2d 100, 18;) P.2d 664, awl 
cases cited therein. There is no evidence in the record 
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which would show that the Taylors did not anticipate 
that the water table in the land would be lowered during 
the construction of the Willard Canal and that after 
construction the water table would be restored to its 
original level, for this obviously is the natural, necessary 
and ordinary use to which the property would be put by 
the grantee. The case of Albers v. Los Angeles County, 
42 Cal. Reptr. 89, 389 P. 2d 129, cited on Page 25 of 
appellants' brief is not in point because the damages 
there were not a natural, necessary or reasonable inci-
dent to the construction of the road and making the 
fill. (P. 138, 389 P.2d). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly dismissed this action on 
Motion of the defendant upon the ground, among others, 
that the District is not the proper party defendant. The 
Weber Basin Project, including the Willard Canal, 
is a federal reclamation projec't and under applicable 
federal statutes and the repayment contract and amend-
atory contract the defendant acts only as fiscal agent 
for the United States, with no participation in the de-
sign and construction of project facilities and with no 
participation in the acquisition of right of way and the 
operation of project works, except upon the request 
of the United States. The evidence is undisputed that 
the defendant was not requested to acquire the right 
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of way across the land now owned by the plaintiffs and 
had no part in the operation of the canal. 
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiffs, does not prove damage to the plaintiffs' 
land resulting from the construction and operation of 
the canal. That the canal did not leak is admitted in the 
appellants' brief, and the testimony of experts is un-
contradicted that the breaking of hardpan and the 
operation of flap valves in the canal would not cause 
the ground water to rise above its pre-canal level. There 
is no evidence of the "surging and resurging" of the 
ground water table as claimed by the plaintiffs. 
The United States acquired part of the land iu 
question from the plaintiffs' predecessors Riley E. 
Taylor and wife and any taking which would support 
an inverse condemnation action took place while the 
Taylors owned the land. The conveyance of the land 
by deed to the plaintiffs would not carry with it a cause 
of action for additional compensation. The judgment 
of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Neil R. 0 lmstead 
E. J. Skeen 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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